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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
that the court should have sustained the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict.
The court points out that a person seeking to avoid a contract for mis-
representation or lack of capacity is bound to restore all that he has re-
ceived under it, and, while he might not be compelled to rescind before
the suit is brought, as where he does not know of the existence or
nature of the contract, still the rescission and offer to restore must be at
the earliest practicable moment. The plaintiff's failure to so offer before
defendant's motion for a directed verdict resulted in too long a delay and
hence barred a recovery. Seemingly the only element which obviates the
necessity of returning the money is "actual intended fraud."7
L. BRUNETTE
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
AcTIoN-ABoLITION OF DISTINCTION AS TO FORm-AvAABiTY OF Mo-
TION IN NATURE OF CORAM NOBIS IN CHANCERY PROCEEDINr.-Section 721 of
the Illinois Civil Practice Act, abolishing the writ of error coram nobis 2
and providing a similar remedy by motion to correct "all errors in fact.
committed in the proceedings of any court of record, and which, by the
common law, could have been corrected by said writ," was held appli-
cable to chancery proceedings in the recent case of Frank v. Newburger.3
It has generally been held, in the absence of statutory provision otherwise,
"that a writ of error coram nobis has no place in chancery proceedings,
and is strictly a common-law writ, ' 4 although some equity courts have
treated the petition for the writ as a bill to avoid a decree5 or a motion
for a new trial.6 While the Frank case seems to reach a just result,7
7 Pawnee Coal Co. v. Royce, 184 Ill. 402, 56 N. E. 621 (1900).
1 "The writ of error coram nobis is hereby abolished, and all errors in fact,
committed in the proceedings of any court of record, and which, by the common
law, could have been corrected by said writ, may be corrected by the court in
which the error was committed, upon motion in writing, made at any time within
five years after the rendition of final judgment in the case, upon reasonable
notice ...... Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 196.
2 The writ of error coram nobis, or coram vobis, was a common law writ for
the purpose of correcting a judgment in the same court in which it was rendered.
The writ was predicated on an alleged error in fact not appearing on the record,
which error it was presumed would not have been committed had the fact in the
first instance been brought to the notice of the court. See Fugate v. State, 85 Miss.
94, 37 So. 554, 107 Am. St. Rep. 268 (1904), and 2 R. C. L. 305, § 259.
3 298 Ill. App. 548, 19 N. E. (2d) 147 (1939).
4 Bradford v. White, 130 Ark. 532, 197 S.W. 1175, L.R.A. 1918A 1177 (1917). See
also Reid's Adm'r v. Strider's Adm'r, 7 Gratt (Va.) 76, 54 Am. Dec. 120 (1850).
5 "The pleading . . . though denominated a petition for writs of error coram
nobis, is a bill to avoid a decree as well." Leftwick v. Hamilton, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.)
310 (1872).
6 Estes v. Nell, 163 Mo. 387, 63 S.W. 724 (1901).
7 The original proceeding was one to foreclose a mortgage. The defendants
defaulted. Thereafter, the complainants, by leave of court, amended their com-
plaint without notifying the defendants. The new decree found a larger amount to
be due than that which had been allowed by the original decree and also stated
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendants "the value of all
NOTES AND COMMENTS
there is much to be said for the view of the dissent that the clause in
Section 72, "which, by the common law, could have been corrected . ..,"
seems to modify "all errors in fact" and thus was probably inserted by
the legislature for the purpose of limiting the use of the motion to cases
in which coram nobis was available before the act. W. L. SCHLEGEL
APPEAL AND ERROR-JuRISDICTION-WREN APPELLATE COURT HAS JURISDIC-
TION OVER APPEAL PERFECTED AFTER DIsMISsAL.-The First Division of the Il-
linois Appellate Court, in the recent case of Melsha v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corporation,' has held that, where an appeal was dismissed for fail-
ure to file the transcript of the record within the sixty day period from
the date of the filing of the notice of appeal, 2 which failure was not
due to culpable negligence on the part of the appellant,3 the appeal could
still be perfected under Section 764 of the Civil Practice Act, it being
shown that there was merit in the appeal. The contention that this prac-
tice would permit two appeals was rejected on the ground that the first
attempt had resulted in a nullity.
Under the former practice the right to appeal was statutory, and it
was held that the statute must be strictly followed. The reason for this
strictness lay in the fact that relief by writ of error could still be
secured as a matter of right in civil cases even though the original ap-
peal failed. 5 Since the writ of error is now abolished, the court concludes
that the reason for the rule of strict construction no longer exists.6
The decision appears to be just. Any other construction of the section
would mean that the right to have a judgment reviewed might be de-
nied to one having a meritorious case through a mere technicality.
M. H. TUTTLE
assets received by them from the two estates of their parents for any defi-
ciency .... " The defendants filed their motion under Section 72 to vacate the
new decree and all other orders subsequent to that decree, in order that they
might defend the amended bill of foreclosure, which petition was granted.
1 299 Ill. App. 157, 19 N. E. (2d) 753 (1939).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 259.36, as amended by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1938 Supp.,
Ch. 110, § 259.36, provides among other things that "The record on appeal shall be
transmitted to the reviewing court not more than 60 days after notice of appeal has
been filed."
3 The failure arose from the illness of appellant's counsel.
4 "No appeal shall be taken to the Supreme or Appellate Court after the expira-
tion of ninety days from the entry of the order, decree, judgment or other
determination complained of; but, notice of appeal may be filed after the expira-
tion of said ninety days, and within the period of one year, by order of the review-
ing court, upon motion and notice to adverse parties, and upon a showing by
affidavit that there is merit in appellant's claim for an appeal and that the delay
was not due to appellant's culpable negligence." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 200.
5 Drummer Creek Drain. Dist. v. Roth, 244 Ill. 68, 91 N. E. 63 (1910).
6 The court distinguishes the case of People ex rel. Bender v. Davis, 365 Ill. 389,
6 N. E. (2d) 643 (1937), which was followed by the Appellate Court for the third
division in Schroeder v. Campbell, 289 Ill. App. 337, 7 N. E. (2d) 329 (1937), and
Moss v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 289 Ill. App. 379, 7 N. E. (2d) 468 (1937), on the
ground that in the Bender case the appeal had been heard on its merits and that
the matter came up in the Supreme Court on a petition for mandamus in which
the order dismissing the appeal could not be considered.
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EXECUTION-ExEcUTION AGAINST THE PERSON-SPECIAL FINDING THAT DE-
FENDANT WAS MALICIOUS AS CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ISSUANCE OF THE
WRIT UNDER ILLINOIS STATTE.-The recent Illinois Appellate Court case
of Miles v. Glad' involves an interesting change in the Illinois statute
2
relating to executions against the person.5 Formerly, the successful
plaintiff in a tort action could take out execution against the person of
the defendant without any showing of malice. 4 The defendant was then
compelled to apply to the County Court for a determination that the
tort action was not founded on malice in order to obtain his release. 5
The Miles case decided that, under the present modified act, it is a con-
dition precedent to the issuance of such an execution that the jury, or
the court, if the case is tried without a jury, make a special finding that
malice is present. The court also held that, if the defendant feels that
execution has been improperly issued, his remedy is to apply to the court
where the judgment was rendered to have the execution quashed. 6
W. L. SCHLEGEL
1 19 N. E. (2d) 844 (III. App., 1939).
2 Prior to amendment, the provision read as follows: "No execution shall issue
against the body of the defendant, except when the judgment shall have been
obtained for a tort committed by such defendant, or unless the defendant shall
have been held to bail upon a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum (respondendum) as
provided by law, or he shall refuse to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his
creditors." Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 77, § 5. The defendant obtained his
release under Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 72, § 5, which reads as follows:
"When any person is arrested or imprisoned upon any process issued for the
purpose of holding such person to bail upon any indebtedness, or in any civil
action when malice is not the gist of the action ... such person may be released
from such arrest or imprisonment upon complying with provisions of this Act."
This latter provision has not been amended, but the former section now reads:
"No execution shall issue against the body of the defendant except when the
judgment shall have been obtained for a tort committed by such defendant, and
it shall appear from a special finding of the jury, or from a special finding by the
court, if the case is tried by the court without a jury, that malice is the gist
of the action .. " Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 77, § 5.
3 Execution against the person was a well known common-law remedy. It was
affected by the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. It is well settled that such an
execution is not a violation of a constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
for debt. The judgment, while a debt for some purposes, is considered in the na-
ture of a punishment where it has been obtained for tort. People ex rel. Brennan
v. Cotton, 14 Ill. 414 (1853); Lipman v. Goebel, 357 Ill. 315, 192 N. E. 203 (1934),
cert. den. 294 U. S. 712, 55 S. Ct. 508, 79 L. Ed. 1246 (1935).
4 See Fetz v. People, 239 Ill. App. 250 (1926).
5 See Reinwald v. McGregor, 239 I1. App. 240 (1926).
6 Miles v. Glad, 19 N. E. (2d) 844 at 845 (Ill. App., 1939). It was also held that
a special finding by the jury that the defendants were "guilty of wilful and wanton
conduct which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury" was tantamount
to a finding of malice. The court went on to say that "it is manifest that malice
is the gist of an action for assault and battery." In many cases of assault and
battery malice will be present, but sound reasoning would indicate that it is
not an essential element to either of the two torts. See Singer Sewing Mach. Co.
v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N. E. 793 (1911); Booher v. Trainer, 172 Mo. App.
376, 157 S.W. 848 (1913); Pizitz v. Bloomburgh, 206 Ala. 136, 89 So. 287 (1921); Lut-
termann v. Romey, 143 Iowa 233, 121 N.W. 1040 (1909).
